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A BALANCING ACT: FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS AND THE REASONABLE
SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORY
ACCESS TO E-MAIL ACCOUNTS
JOSEPH P. GRYZLO†
Applying 18th Century notions about searches and seizures to
modern technology, however, is easier said than done, as we are
asked to measure Government actions taken in the “computer
age” against Fourth Amendment frameworks crafted long before
this technology existed. As we do so, we must keep in mind that
“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine an individual—let’s call him Steven—owned and
operated a business.2 Steven was convicted on counts stemming
from the business conducting a scheme to defraud its customers
through false advertising, as well as fabricated customer
satisfaction and product effectiveness statistics.3 He received a
twenty-five-year sentence for his conduct, had to pay a fine of
about $100,000, and was forced to surrender hundreds of millions
of dollars.4
Part of the government’s evidence against Steven came from
information derived from thousands of e-mails he had sent and
received involving one particular e-mail account he had with an
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).5 Early on in the investigation,
†
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Law.
1
United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2014) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
2
The following facts come from United States. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th
Cir. 2010).
3
Id. at 277, 281.
4
Id. at 281–82.
5
Id. at 282–83. The ISP provided and hosted the e-mail account involved in this
case. Id.
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the government had requested the ISP save copies of all future emails involving Steven’s account, which the ISP did.6 Later in
the investigation, the government required the ISP to provide the
preserved e-mails, once by subpoena and once by an ex parte
court order.7 At no time did the government obtain, nor even
apply for, a warrant to search Steven’s e-mails.8 Before trial,
Steven moved to exclude the e-mails, alleging a Fourth
Amendment violation; however, this motion was denied.9 The
foregoing facts come from an actual case, United States v.
Warshak, which was ultimately appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.10
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the government had
violated Steven’s Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining access
to his e-mails through the ISP without a warrant.11 In its
analysis, the court concluded that Steven’s subjective expectation
of privacy in the content of his e-mails stored, sent, and received
through the ISP was objectively reasonable.12 This is important
because if an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is
unreasonable, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.13 As

6

Id. at 283.
Id.
8
Id. at 274.
9
Id. at 281.
10
Id. at 266.
11
Id. at 288. However, the court ultimately upheld the government’s use of
information stemming from this e-mail account because the government had relied
in good faith on provisions of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”). Id. at 292.
The SCA authorized the steps the government took in preserving and directing
disclosure of the copies of Steven’s e-mail account, and the government had used the
SCA in good faith as a guide, as the SCA had yet to be declared unconstitutional to
the extent it permitted warrantless seizure of e-mails. Id. at 289. As a result, the
information the government obtained from the account could be used as evidence,
and Steven did not get the benefit of the holding. Id. at 289–90. But, because the
court found that the government’s conduct was a violation of Fourth Amendment
protections, the court further held the SCA unconstitutional in this context. Id. at
288. Therefore, good faith reliance on the SCA going forward will not exist, and such
conduct in the future will result in the exclusion of such evidence. Id.
12
Id. at 286. The Warshak court pointed out that neither the ability of a third
party to access the contents of communication, nor the right of access to the
communication of the company providing the service necessarily defeats the
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 286–87.
13
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is
determined by a two-part test: (1) the individual must exhibit an actual expectation
7
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a result, the court concluded that Fourth Amendment protections
apply to the contents of e-mail accounts stored with third parties,
such as ISPs.14 Thus, a warrant based on probable cause is
needed for the government to constitutionally compel an ISP or
other e-mail service provider to provide the contents of an e-mail
account.15
However, the determination in Warshak that a warrant
based on probable cause is needed for the government to obtain
access to an e-mail account from an e-mail service provider raises
another question. If the government does have probable cause, it
will most likely have probable cause to justify a warrant for some
portion of an e-mail account, but will not have reason to believe
that the entire account consists solely of e-mails relating to the
investigation.16
If the government applies for a warrant
requesting access to an entire e-mail account from an e-mail
service provider, will a showing of probable cause for some of the
account enable the government to have a warrant application
granted for the entire account? In such cases, there are potential
complications regarding the particularity of such warrants and
the reasonableness of the breadth of the warrants.17
On one side, since there is probable cause for a portion of the
account, the warrant request should be granted so that the
government can have access to the information for which it does
have probable cause.18 On the other side, since the government
does not have probable cause to believe the entire account

of privacy, and (2) the expectation must be objectively reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
15
Id. Courts in other circuits have cited Warshak with approval. E.g., In re
Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email
Accounts/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug.
27, 2013) [hereinafter In re Target Email/Skype Accounts]; United States v. Bode,
No. ELH-12-158, 2013 WL 4501303, at *15 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2013); United States v.
Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012). The United States Supreme Court
has yet to address the issue.
16
See United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
“few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked ‘drug
records’ ”).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 354 (1974) (noting that “restrictions upon means of law enforcement
handicap society’s capacity to deal with two of its most deeply disturbing problems:
the fact and the fear of crime”).
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consists solely of evidence of criminal activity germane to the
investigation,
there
are
Fourth
Amendment
privacy
complications regarding any e-mails not satisfying the probable
cause showing.19
The problem lies in the unknown location of the relevant
information; the location of e-mails that are relevant to an
investigation is not known prior to someone examining the
account and parsing responsive from unresponsive material.20 As
a result, the government will make a warrant application for the
entire account. A court faced with such an application has two
general choices: (1) deny the warrant application for the entire
account, or (2) grant the warrant application for the entire
account. Although this issue has yet to surface in the circuit
courts, a number of district courts have recently been confronted
with this problem and have been divided in their rulings.21
The two general approaches taken by the district courts
recognize competing interests.
Denial of such warrant
applications recognizes the individual’s Fourth Amendment right
to privacy,22 while granting such warrant applications recognizes
the government’s investigatory ability interest and the desire for
safety and security.23 With these competing interests in mind,
this Note argues that, in such situations, a warrant application
providing the government access to an entire e-mail account
should be granted. Not granting the warrant and some of the
alternatives that have been suggested in light of this position do
not adequately respect the government’s legitimate investigatory
interest.
Coupled with certain limitations and ex ante
19
See id. (recognizing that liberty erodes when safeguards to liberty are relaxed
“[i]n the face of plausible-sounding governmental claims of a need to deal with
widely frightening and emotion-freighted threats to the good order of society”).
20
See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 140–41 (2011) (comparing a search for responsive
electronic evidence to searching for needles in a haystack and pointing out that, to
find the needles, it is necessary to look through a lot of hay).
21
Compare In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL
4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (declining to grant a warrant giving the
government access to an entire e-mail account when only partial probable cause
existed), with In re A Warrant for All Content and Other Information Associated with
the Email Account xxxxxxx@Gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by
Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter In re Gmail
Account] (granting such a warrant).
22
See Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 354.
23
Id.
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minimization procedures, a modified pro-access approach
effectively strikes a balance between the competing investigatory
and privacy interests.
Part I of this Note examines the Fourth Amendment
particularity requirement, explains how it relates to the breadth
of probable cause, and surveys how these concepts have been
applied in the electronic context. Part II assesses the issue of the
breadth of probable cause regarding e-mail accounts in particular
and reviews the different approaches the district courts have
taken in addressing this issue, as well as other proposed
solutions that may be implemented in accordance with these
approaches.
Lastly, Part III proposes a resolution to the
controversy, balancing the competing interests of privacy and the
government’s investigatory needs, and argues for a tempered
version of permitting the government access to an entire e-mail
account when probable cause only exists for a portion of the
account.
I.

A.

OVERVIEW: FOURTH AMENDMENT PARTICULARITY AND
BREADTH OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Framing the Issue

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.24

In Warshak, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit determined that the search and seizure of e-mail content,
received from an ISP without a warrant is unreasonable.25 As a
result, the warrant requirements stated in the Fourth
Amendment apply in this context. These requirements are:
(1) probable cause; (2) support of the probable cause by some
form of affirmation; and (3) particularity in the description of
what is to be searched and seized.26 In addition, there must also
24
25
26

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

FINAL_GRYZLO

500

10/25/2016 9:01 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:495

be probable cause to support the breadth of what is being
sought.27 As this Note assumes probable cause exists for some
part of an e-mail account, the discussion will focus on the
particularity requirement, its meaning, and how it relates to the
breadth of probable cause.
B.

Reasons for the Particularity Requirement

The particularity requirement is recognized to have been
included in the Fourth Amendment largely as a result of the
Framers’ distaste for British Writs of Assistance and, more
expansively, general warrants.28 During colonial times, the
British government would issue Writs of Assistance, which
essentially amounted to broad, general search warrants.29 The
goal of these warrants was to give the British government power
to enforce trade and navigation laws in the Colonies by allowing
officers broad permission to search for smuggled goods.30 Neither
the house to be searched, nor the type of goods to be searched for,
would be specified and full discretion over the search was given
to the officers conducting the search.31
The Fourth Amendment protects against such general
warrants and general searches by requiring particularity in a
warrant’s description.32 With this requirement, the officials
executing the warrant are limited as to what they can search and
seize and do not have unfettered discretion.33 This recognizes the
27

See infra note 53; see also In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (listing the requirements of a
search warrant: “it must be based on probable cause, meet particularity
requirements, be reasonable in nature of breadth, and be supported by affidavit”).
28
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981). For a twentieth-century
example of a “general warrant,” see Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965)
(characterizing a warrant that authorized any “books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of the Communist
Party in Texas” as “constitutionally intolerable”).
29
THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 18
(2010).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 18–19.
32
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
33
Id. (“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to
be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is
left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”). This statement has been
interpreted to mean that the executing officer does not have discretion as a matter of
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individual’s interest in privacy and freedom from unreasonable
governmental intrusion by restricting the scope of the
government’s investigation to that for which the government has
probable cause.34
Other reasons for the particularity requirement have been
noted. These reasons are closely related to the overall desire to
avoid general warrants and the goal of protecting an individual’s
privacy as much as possible. For example, since warrant
applications are granted by a magistrate—a neutral third party
that operates outside the government’s investigation35—the
particularity requirement provides independent judgment on,
and clarification regarding, what may be constitutionally
searched and seized.36 Particularity in a warrant’s description
thus gives clarity as to the warrant’s scope, due to the limited
authorization granted by the magistrate.37 This helps protect an
individual’s interest in privacy by giving the government clear
direction and authorization as to what is to be searched for and
what is to be seized.38
Another reason given for the existence of a particularity
requirement is that it helps give sharper teeth to the
requirement of probable cause, not requiring it in a vague sense,
but instead for a particular place and for particular things.39 As
with clarification,40 specificity regarding probable cause helps
protect an individual’s privacy by limiting the scope of the
government’s search to that which may be reasonably expected to

opinion to determine whether a particular thing is covered within the parameters of
the warrant, but does have discretion in determining whether a thing is covered as a
matter of fact. See Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 165 S.E.2d 302, 307 (Ga. 1968). This
interpretation implicitly recognizes that the review of some things not described
under the warrant is permissible. Id.
34
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967). For an explanation of
probable cause, see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)
(“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the
officers’] . . . knowledge . . . [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution [to believe that] an offense has been or is being committed.”
(internal quotation mark omitted) (citation omitted)).
35
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.6(a) (5th ed. 2014).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
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produce evidence related to the investigation.41 As a result, the
particularity requirement safeguards property of an individual
by limiting the government to investigating only what may
reasonably produce evidence of a crime.
C.

The Meaning of Particularity

Particularity limits what places are to be searched and what
objects are to be seized.42 This requirement, along with the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, restricts a search to the area necessary to find the
evidence for which the government has probable cause.43 Thus, if
a warrant fails to appropriately define the scope of a search, or
the resulting search extends beyond what is necessary to find
what is reasonably sought, there is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.44
Whether a warrant’s description satisfies the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement is determined based on
the language of the warrant and the facts and circumstances of
the case.45 At its core, the Fourth Amendment revolves around
reasonableness.46 To determine whether a warrant fails the
particularity requirement, the focus must be on “whether there
exists probable cause to support the breadth of the search that
was authorized.”47 In the context of searches, a warrant is
sufficiently particular if the executing officer can identify the

41
See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (explaining that one function of
the particularity requirement is to assure individuals that warrants are executed
under lawful authority and are appropriately limited to searching for what is
needed).
42
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43
See LAFAVE, supra note 36 (“Knowledge that some objects connected with
criminal activity are to be found on certain premises is no basis for permitting an
unrestricted search of those premises . . . the described premises may only be
searched as long and as intensely as is reasonable to find the things described in the
warrant.”).
44
Id.
45
See Martha Applebaum, Note, “Wrong But Reasonable”: The Fourth
Amendment Particularity Requirement After United States v. Leon, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 577, 580–81 (1987); see also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness.”).
46
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
47
United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Hernandez, No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010 WL 26544, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)).
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place the warrant directs the officer to search with reasonable
certainty.48 Regarding seizures, the determination is ultimately
based on what discretion is given to the officer executing the
warrant.49 The officer must be able to determine whether a
particular thing is covered under the warrant, not as a matter of
opinion, but as a matter of fact.50 If the officer can determine
whether a particular thing is covered under the warrant as a
matter of fact with reasonable certainty, the warrant is
sufficiently particular.51 The underlying rationale is that the
warrant, and not the executing officer, dictates where to search,
what to search for, and what to seize.
1.

Particularity and the Breadth of Probable Cause

A concept closely tied to the particularity requirement in the
language of a warrant is the breadth of probable cause.52 The
standard for sufficient probable cause is, given the situation set
forth in the affidavit, whether there is a “fair probability” that
evidence of criminality relating to the investigation will be found
in the particular place specified in the affidavit.53 As the
issuance of a warrant is contingent upon a probable cause
showing, the government must have probable cause to search for
and seize the items described in the warrant and must have

48

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
See Applebaum, supra note 45, at 580; see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
50
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
51
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
52
The Fourth Amendment requires “probable cause . . . particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. Therefore, for a warrant to be issued, the government must have probable cause
for the particular description contained in the warrant. Id.
53
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983); see United States v. Hernandez,
No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010 WL 26544, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010) (explaining that
one particularity-related inquiry is “whether the items listed as ‘to be seized’ in the
warrant were overbroad because they lacked probable cause”). In Hernandez, the
court pointed out that particularity in the language of the warrant is a closely
related, but distinct, legal issue from the breadth of probable cause. Id. In the latter
instance, the court referred to the analysis as one into the breadth of the warrant,
whereas in the former instance, the inquiry is into the particularity of the language
of the warrant. Id.
49
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probable cause to justify the breadth of the search.54 Whether
the breadth of the search is justified is based on the specific
circumstances of a case.55
This concept is best illustrated by example.56 Imagine the
police observe an individual leaving an apartment, one that was
known by the police to contain marijuana. The police observe the
individual holding a large brown paper bag the size of marijuana
packages that the police had seen earlier. They watch as the
individual walks from the apartment to his car, places the bag in
his car, and drives away. As the individual drives off, the police
pull him over. They search both the bag the individual was
observed carrying from the apartment to his car and the rest of
his car, as well.57
Under the facts of this example, the police had probable
cause to search the bag; their prior knowledge regarding the
apartment the individual was seen leaving, as well as their
observance of the size of the bag and how it was similar in size to
previously seen marijuana packages, gave the police probable
cause to believe the bag contained evidence.58 However, the
police did not have probable cause to search the rest of the car.59
No evidence existed for the government to believe the rest of the
car contained any evidence, and, as a result, the police searching

54
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has recognized that this
requirement is not absolute: “In searches for papers, it is certain that some
innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.” Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). In particular, this requirement is relaxed
when the location of the relevant information is not known with exactness:
Where proof of wrongdoing depends upon documents . . . whose precise
nature cannot be known in advance, law enforcement officers must be
afforded the leeway to wade through a potential morass of information in
the target location to find the particular evidence which is properly
specified in the warrant.
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (D.N.J. 2001)).
55
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39.
56
The facts of this example are based on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991).
57
In Acevedo, the officers did not need a warrant because the “automobile
exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied. Id. at 566, 573.
However, as the court recognized, even if a warrant is not necessary due to an
exception, the government must still have probable cause to justify the breadth of a
search. Id. at 579–80.
58
Id. at 566–67, 572–73.
59
Id. at 579–80.
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the rest of the individual’s car amounted to an overbroad search
outside of the scope of their probable cause.60 Under the Fourth
Amendment, the search of the car is impermissible.61
2.

The Plain View Exception

Although the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in
the language of the warrant and the scope of probable cause,
courts have recognized instances where items that are not
described in the warrant can be seized. One exception involves
items not specified in a warrant, but in “plain view” of officers
executing a valid warrant.62 Under this exception, for example, if
officials have a warrant to search for certain evidence in a
particular area and come across other evidence reflecting
criminality not within the parameters of the warrant but in
“plain view,” this evidence may be seized by the officials.63
Importantly, the officers who seize the items in plain view must
have a legal right—a warrant, for example—to be in the area in
which the items in plain view were found.64 Absent some legal
justification to be in the particular place, even if an item clearly
reflects criminality, the officers cannot invoke the plain view
exception and seize the item.65
In addition, it must be
immediately apparent to the officials that the item in plain view
constitutes evidence of a crime.66 Despite these limitations, the
particularity required of the language of a warrant and the
corresponding particularity required regarding the scope of
probable cause are circumvented by this exception.

60

Id.
Id.
62
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The plain view
exception also applies in instances in which officials are lawfully in a particular
area, even absent a warrant. 68 GEORGE L. BLUM ET AL., AM. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 241 (2014).
63
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465; see also, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
142 (1990) (determining that a police officer who had a warrant authorizing the
search of an individual’s home for stolen property could seize weapons observed in
plain view, even though the weapons were not included in the warrant).
64
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
65
Id.
66
Id.; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 (noting that an officer must also lawfully
be able to access the object intended to be seized under the plain view exception).
61
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D. The Fourth Amendment in the Electronic Context
1.

Early Developments

A starting point in consideration of the Fourth Amendment
in the electronic context is that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”67 This means that the Fourth Amendment
may apply not only to searches and seizures in a tangible sense,
but also to searches and seizures in the electronic world of
information in which persons may reasonably have an
expectation of privacy.68
For example, in Katz v. United States, the government
conducted an investigation of an individual suspected of passing
bets across state lines, a violation of a federal statute.69 As part
of its investigation, the government placed a listening and
recording device on the side of a public telephone booth where the
individual made his phone calls.70 During trial, the government
used these conversations as evidence.71 The defendant argued
that the government’s listening to and recording of his phone
calls were a violation of the Fourth Amendment.72 Both the
defendant and the government focused their arguments on
whether the telephone booth was a “constitutionally protected
area” and whether physical invasion of such an area was
required for a Fourth Amendment violation.73
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the defendant
in finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the government’s
surveillance, but explained that the parties’ arguments were
misplaced.74 Instead of focusing on the location of the defendant,
the appropriate consideration involves the person—whether the
government violated an expectation of privacy upon which an
individual justifiably relied.75 And, the Court held, since the

67

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id. at 351–52; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (holding a
New York statute, which authorized eavesdropping through warrants requiring less
than the Fourth Amendment, unconstitutional).
69
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 348–49.
73
Id. at 349–52.
74
Id. at 351–52, 358.
75
Id. at 351, 353; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
68
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defendant justifiably relied on the privacy of his conversations
within the phone booth, Fourth Amendment protections applied
to the defendant’s telephone conversations therein.76
In a similar vein, Berger v. New York77 recognized that
conversations can be “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.78 Berger involved the examination of a New York
state statute authorizing electronic eavesdropping and whether
its requirements were in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment.79 The Court ultimately found that the statute ran
afoul of Fourth Amendment protections by authorizing searches
and seizures that fell short of the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements, thereby characterizing the New York statute as
plainly overbroad.80 Implicit in this conclusion is that Fourth
Amendment protection can apply to conversations in which
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy, including
electronically transmitted conversation.81
2.

Recent Developments in the Electronic Context

Katz and Berger establish that Fourth Amendment
protections can apply to nontangible electronic things, such as
phone conversation. Later cases have also affirmed this idea,82
including in the context of e-mail accounts.83 Yet, these cases do
not confront the Fourth Amendment requirements of
particularity and limited breadth in seeking access to electronic
information. More recent developments provide some guidance
on these issues.84
76

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
78
Id. at 59.
79
Id. at 43–44.
80
Id. at 62–64.
81
See supra Introduction (explaining that, in United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), Fourth Amendment protections were extended to e-mail
accounts).
82
E.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that, under the
Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required to search the contents of a cell phone).
83
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
84
Language from the recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., presents the issue well:
This pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine
electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for
electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering
the Fourth Amendment irrelevant. The problem can be stated very simply:
There is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without
77
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For example, in the context of computer hard drive searches,
courts will often permit off-site review.85 This involves the
creation of a mirror-image copy of the hard drive, which impacts
the target’s use of his computer as little as possible, and in return
provides a more convenient means for the government to search
the target’s information.86 This procedure allows the government
to obtain the data on the hard drive for which it has probable
cause, but, in so doing, it also provides the government access to
data on the hard drive for which it does not have probable cause.
However, after obtaining the hard drive, the subsequent search
of the hard drive must still be conducted in accordance with the
Fourth Amendment’s rule of reasonableness.87 Reasonableness is
considered on a case-by-case basis.88
The parameters of reasonableness have been shaped in
recent years regarding warrants for electronic information.
Search warrants authorizing the wholesale search of “computers
and computer equipment” and “computer records or data” have
been upheld as reasonable.89 The Tenth Circuit has also noted
that a search of the contents of a hard drive may extend as far as
necessary to find the items specified to be seized under the
warrant.90 In one case, the court upheld a warrant that
permitted the search of “ ‘any [computer] equipment’ that can
create or display computer data” and “any and all computer
software.”91 Because the government agent who conducted the
somehow examining its contents—either by opening it and looking, using
specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such
technique. . . . By necessity, government efforts to locate particular files
will require examining a great many other files to exclude the possibility
that the sought-after data are concealed there.
621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).
85
United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 136.
88
Id.
89
See United States v. Farlow, 681 F.3d 15, 16–19 (1st Cir. 2012); see also
United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Applying a
reasonableness analysis on a case-by-case basis, the federal courts have rejected
most particularity challenges to warrants authorizing the seizure and search of
entire personal or business computers.”); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 234
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding seizure of six entire hard drives reasonable).
90
United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that, as a
practical matter, finding relevant information may often involve the government
looking at many folders and documents contained on a computer hard drive).
91
Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1270 (alteration in original).
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search testified that he limited the search to certain types of files
likely to reveal the type of information described in the warrant,
the court upheld the warrant and denied the defendant’s motion
to suppress.92
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS, PARTICULARITY, AND
THE BREADTH OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE E-MAIL CONTEXT
In United States v. Warshak,93 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Fourth
Amendment protections extend to the content of e-mail accounts
and that it is constitutionally impermissible for the government
to obtain access to an individual’s e-mails from a service provider
without a warrant based upon probable cause.94 As a result, the
government must obtain a warrant to have access to an
individual’s e-mails.
Part of the government’s burden in
obtaining a warrant requires the affidavit in support of the
warrant to particularly describe what is sought—this applies to
both the place to be searched and the things to be seized—and
that the breadth of the warrant’s scope is reasonable.95 Due to
the nature of e-mail,96 however, the concepts of particularity and
breadth in this context have proven problematic and there is
currently a lack of consensus in the district courts as to what
these requirements entail.97
The basic approaches fall into two camps, with one side
denying warrant applications for an individual’s entire e-mail
account, and the other granting such warrants.98 Both courts
and commentators have offered suggestions and adjustments
regarding these approaches.99 The following sections explain the
two approaches, their rationales, and the suggestions that have
been proposed in accordance with these approaches, which aim to
balance the competing interests of the government and the
individual.

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id.
631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 288.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See infra Sections II.A, B.
See infra Sections II.A, B.
See infra Sections II.A, B.
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Approach One: Deny the Warrant Application

One approach is to deny a warrant application providing the
government access to an entire e-mail account when probable
cause has not been established for the entire account. For
example, in In re Applications for Search Warrants for
Information Associated With Target Email Accounts/Skype
Accounts (“In re Target Email/Skype Accounts”),100 the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas denied such a
request.101
In that case, the targets of the search were alleged to have
stolen computer equipment and transported it across the
country.102 The government argued that the targets’ e-mail
accounts were used to facilitate the criminal activity and sought
search warrants103 to search for evidence of criminal activity in
the accounts.104 In denying the search warrant applications, the
court concluded that the content listed on the applications, if
handed over, would amount to a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as the warrants failed to place any restrictions
whatsoever on which communications and information were to be
handed over.105 This was problematic in the eyes of the court
100
Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013).
101
Id. at *10. The District of Kansas has taken this position in other similar
cases as well. See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Case Nos. 12-MJ8119-DJW and Info. Associated with 12-MJ-8191-DJW Target Email Address, Nos.
12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *11 (D. Kan. Sept. 21,
2012).
102
2013 WL 4647554, at *1.
103
The following language is illustrative of the breadth of the warrants:
[The service provider shall disclose] [t]he contents of all emails, instant
messages, and chat logs/sessions associated with the account, including
stored or preserved copies of emails, instant messages, and chat
logs/sessions sent to and from the account; draft emails; deleted emails,
instant messages, and chat logs/sessions preserved pursuant to a request
made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f); the source and destination addresses
associated with each email, instant message, and chat logs/session, as well
as the date and time at which each email, instant message, and chat
logs/session was sent, and the size and length of each email . . . .
Id.
104
Id. The procedure of requesting the content and information from the service
providers was governed by The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
Id. at *2. Section 2703 authorizes the government’s ability to request electronically
stored or held communications, such as e-mail, pursuant to a search warrant under
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
105
Id. at *8. “The warrants as currently proposed give the government virtual
carte blanche to review the content of all electronic communications associated with
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because the warrants failed to establish probable cause to search
all of the account information.106 Comparing the government’s
warrant applications to one requesting that a post office provide
copies of the contents of all mail to and from a certain address,
which would not pass constitutional muster, the court concluded
that the same attempt in the electronic context should likewise
not be held constitutional.107
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California has taken the same approach when faced with such an
application. In the case In re: [REDACTED]@gmail.com,108 the
court took particular issue with a warrant application’s lack of a
date range for the desired e-mails, and a lack of language
indicating that the government would return or destroy
nonresponsive information.109
In response to the above concens, some suggestions have
been made as potential solutions to the problem. For example,
although the court in In re Target Email/Skype Accounts did not
advocate for any particular procedural mechanism that could be
utilized to avoid overbroad warrant applications while still
providing the government with access to portions of an e-mail
account, the court did provide a few suggestions110: (1) asking the
service provider to limit the amount of content requested by
restricting the information to e-mails with certain terms, or mail
only to and from certain recipients; (2) appointing someone to
hire an independent vendor to use computerized search
techniques to review the information for relevance; or
(3) establishing a filter group to review the information for
relevance.111
the accounts and fail to adequately limit the discretion of the government-authorized
agents executing the warrants.” Id. at *9.
106
Id. at *8.
107
Id. The court noted that while neither the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, nor the Stored Communications Act placed this limitation on the
government, the Fourth Amendment did. Id. at *9 (“To comport with the Fourth
Amendment, the warrants must contain sufficient limits or boundaries so that the
government-authorized agent reviewing the communications can ascertain which
email communications and information the agent is authorized to review.”).
108
62 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
109
Id. at 1104 (“This unrestricted right to retain and use every bit [the e-mail
account] coughs up undermines the entire effort the application otherwise makes to
limit the obvious impact under the plain view doctrine of providing such unfettered
government access.”).
110
In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, 2013 WL 4647554, at *10.
111
Id.
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Others have advocated for similar approaches. For example,
one scholar suggests that, in the event it is impossible for the
government to describe which e-mails and other content are
sought by the government, the appropriate solution would be to
have the e-mail service provider sift through the content and only
provide the government with the relevant information.112 In the
event e-mail service providers resist this burden, she proposes a
filter-team “consisting of agents or specially-trained computer
personnel who are not involved in the investigation” do the
sifting.113 Through this mechanism, it is argued, the Fourth
Amendment particularity and breadth requirements would be
satisfied.114
B.

Approach Two: Grant the Warrant Application

A contrasting approach some courts have taken when faced
with a warrant application to search an entire e-mail account
where evidence of a crime is located only in individual messages,
is to grant the request. The United States District Courts for the
District of Maine115 and the District of Nevada116 have granted
such requests.117 In addition, in In re A Warrant for All Content
and Other Information Associated with the Email Account

112

Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment
Particularity and Stored Email Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 1013 (2010).
113
Id. at 1014–15.
114
Id. at 1016.
115
United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236–37 (D. Me. 2011). In that
case, the magistrate judge issued a warrant that permitted the government to
search all information relating to an e-mail account of the defendants and to seize
information evidencing the violation of a certain federal statute. Id. at 232. The
District Court denied the defendant’s later Motion to Suppress: “The Fourth
Amendment does not require the government to delegate a prescreening function to
the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are relevant before copies
are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent searching.” Id. at 237.
116
United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-cr-00565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 3798225, at
*20 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011) (agreeing that a prescreening method is not required to
separate irrelevant material from relevant material before providing the
government with access to an e-mail account).
117
In both Taylor and Bickle, the courts also approved a filter process which
functioned to filter out privileged material from the e-mail accounts (e.g. information
between the defendant and his lawyer). However, in neither case was a filter process
used to filter out irrelevant information. Bickle, 2011 WL 3798225, at *20; Taylor,
764 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33, 235.
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xxxxxxx@Gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by
Google, Inc. (“In re Gmail Account”),118 the Southern District of
New York also granted such a request.119
In In re Gmail Account, the government conducted an
investigation into an individual on the basis of possible unlawful
money remitting, conspiracy to commit unlawful money
remitting, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.120 As
part of its investigation, law enforcement made an application for
a search warrant to search the contents of, and all information
associated with, the target’s e-mail account.121 In its application
for the warrant, the government provided probable cause to
believe that the e-mail account was being used to conduct
criminal activity and to believe certain information contained in
the account would reveal evidence of that criminal activity.122
The search warrant required the service provider to disclose “ ‘all
content and other information within the Provider’s possession,
custody, or control associated with’ the email account, including
all emails sent, received, or stored in draft form, all address book
information, and a variety of other information associated with
the account.”123 The search warrant also directed that law
enforcement officials were authorized to comb through the
provided content—that is, the entire account—to locate
categories of information provided for in the warrant.124
The court granted the search warrant application, noting
first that the Fourth Amendment hinges on reasonableness.125
The court then focused its opinion on the reasonableness of the
warrant application.126
It stressed the degree of leniency
regarding which documents could be searched that courts
generally permit when the government conducts a physical
search for evidence.127 This allowance is due to law enforcement’s
need to examine documents in order to perceive their relevance
to the investigation; it is impossible to know beforehand whether

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

33 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389–90.
See id. at 390–96.
Id. at 391–92.
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a document is pertinent to the investigation and, as a result,
sometimes innocuous documents are reviewed.128 Applying this
concept to the case at hand, the court reasoned that the same
logic should apply in the electronic context.129 In addition, the
court disagreed with the option of having the service provider,
Google, examine the account and send over only relevant
information, citing Google’s lack of ability to cull responsive
information, the burden this would place on service providers,
and the fact service providers consist of private employees who
have no constitutional responsibilities to the public as significant
issues that weigh against this option.130
Another case in which a court granted a warrant application
in similar circumstances is In re the Search of Information
Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Apple, Inc. (“In re Apple Account”).131 Overturning
a prior order denying a search warrant request,132 the court held
that the government’s application complied with the Fourth
Amendment.133 While echoing the reasoning utilized in In re
Gmail Account in granting the request, the court did note the
increased risk of infringements on privacy with the mass of
information held in undifferentiated electronic format coupled
with law enforcement’s ability to access such information.134
However, the court explained that the unique challenges posed
when searching for responsive electronic data to gather evidence
requires a practical solution.135 Recognizing the difficulties, if not
impossibilities, created for law enforcement officials in holding
otherwise, the court granted the warrant application.136

128

Id.
Id. at 392.
130
Id. at 394–95.
131
13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter In re Apple Account]. In this
case, the government similarly applied for a search warrant to search an e-mail
account, and provided information to support a finding of probable cause for some of
the information in the account. Id. at 160.
132
In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2014). The prior
order essentially relied on the same reasoning as the court did in In re Target
Email/Skype Accounts. See supra Section II.A.
133
In re Apple Account, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 168.
134
Id. at 163–67.
135
Id. at 166.
136
Id. at 166–67.
129
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Ex Ante Minimization Procedures

Some courts that have granted warrant applications in the
electronic context have imposed ex ante limitations regarding the
handling and retention of the material listed in a warrant.137 For
example, in a case involving a search warrant for content
contained on a personal computer, the Supreme Court of
Vermont upheld an order imposing certain ex ante limitations in
order to ensure that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity and
breadth requirements were not violated.138 In that case, the
court addressed concerns over the constitutional authority of the
magistrate to impose such restrictions.139 Since the restrictions
on a warrant become part of the warrant, the government’s
nonobservance of the restrictions amounts to a constitutional
violation.140
Noting that disagreement exists as to the
constitutionality of ex ante limitations,141 the court ultimately
upheld the limitations.142 The court focused on the fact that the
Fourth Amendment ultimately is based on reasonableness,
pointing out that such restrictions provide one way
reasonableness can be achieved.143 In addition, in the physical,
nonelectronic realm, certain ex ante limitations144 can be, and
As a result, although the Fourth
often are, imposed.145
Amendment does not require ex ante limitations be imposed on a
warrant, the court held that, in appropriate circumstances, the
imposition of ex ante limitations is permitted.146
The use of ex ante minimization procedures has not been
met with universal approval. One argument against imposing
such procedures is that other procedures are available that

137

Examples of such limitations include limiting the permitted search methods,
directing the destruction or return of nonresponsive information, and requiring the
government to place a limit on the amount of time they may search and seize. See In
re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1162–63 (Vt. 2012)
[hereinafter In re Search Warrant].
138
Id. at 1182.
139
Id. at 1166–70.
140
Id. at 1164.
141
See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA.
L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2010).
142
In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170.
143
Id.
144
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145
In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170.
146
Id.
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provide adequate relief, such as suppression motions.147 This
renders the imposition of prospective limitations unnecessary.148
Another argument is that the imposition of prospective
limitations is impermissible altogether, as magistrates do not
have the authority to impose such restrictions.149 Under this
view, such restrictions are unreasonable because they judge the
reasonableness of a search before the search ever takes place and
impermissibly control the method by which a search must be
conducted.150
2.

Elimination of the Plain View Doctrine in the E-mail Context

Another idea that has been suggested to limit the effects of
unrestricted government access to an e-mail account is to
eliminate the plain view doctrine in the electronic context.151
Doing so would allow the government broad access to content,
some of which the government likely does not have probable
cause for, but would prevent the government from using any
information derived from this content that falls outside the scope
of the warrant.152 As a result, this suggestion grants the
government discretion in conducting a search, but preempts use
of seized information at trial to only what was specified in the
warrant.153 So, instead of preventing the government from seeing
information outside the scope of a warrant, this method prevents
the government from using that information. However, like the

147

See In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id.
149
See Kerr, supra note 141, at 1246.
150
Id.
151
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 582–84 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures in a Digital World]. However,
when the article was written in 2005, Kerr noted that “[i]t is too early for courts or
Congress to impose such a rule.” Id. at 583. In a recent Washington Post article,
Kerr suggested that the time may have come, at least for the e-mail context. Orin
Kerr, A Remarkable New Opinion on Search Warrants for Online Accounts – And
Why I Think It’s Wrong [hereinafter New Opinion on Search Warrants
for Online Accounts], WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/remarkable-new-opinion-on-online-accounts.
152
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 582–83.
153
Id. at 583.
148
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suggestion of ex ante minimization procedures, the elimination of
the plain view doctrine in the electronic context has been met
with some disapproval.154
III. THE CURRENT APPROACHES’ INADEQUACIES: PROPOSED
RESOLUTION
District courts have taken inconsistent approaches when
faced with a warrant application that would provide the
government access to an entire e-mail account when probable
cause does not exist for the entire account.155 As a result, this
area of the law is muddled with conflicting views and
incompatible opinions. This conflict derives from the ambiguity
of the Fourth Amendment; as courts have repeatedly quoted, “the
ultimate
touchstone
of
the
Fourth
Amendment
is
‘reasonableness.’ ”156 While reasonableness has developed some
definitional contours in the physical realm, it has proven difficult
to shape in the cybersphere.157
The cases summarized in Part II of this Note provide some
guidance as to what courts interpret reasonableness to mean
regarding particularity in warrant applications for e-mail
accounts and the appropriate breadth of e-mail account
disclosure.158 While the two general approaches agree that
reasonableness involves a balance of the individual’s right to
privacy and the government’s need to investigate criminal
activity, the approaches weigh the two factors differently.159
However, neither approach balances these competing interests
adequately. While denying warrants that request full access to
an individual’s e-mail account or requiring e-mail service
provider or third-party involvement, both which significantly
restrict law enforcement,160 granting such warrants outright fails
to adequately respect the individual’s right to privacy.161 Instead,
an appropriate solution would be to grant warrant applications
154
See Alison Bonelli, Comment, Computer Searches in Plain View: An Analysis
of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 759, 780–81 (2011).
155
See supra Part II.
156
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
157
See supra Part II.
158
See supra Part II.
159
See generally supra Part II.
160
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
161
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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giving the government full access to an e-mail account through
the e-mail service provider, while imposing ex ante minimization
procedures on a case-by-case basis and abolishing the plain view
doctrine in this context.
Through these methods, the
government’s role in investigating crime and the individual’s
right to privacy are balanced in a reasonable manner.
This section elaborates on why the current approaches are
inadequate and proposes a middle ground approach, which
incorporates the rationales behind the current approaches to
achieve a reasonable solution. In addition, potential criticisms of
the proposed solution are considered and addressed.
A.

Why the Current Approaches Are Inadequate

The two current approaches each have troublesome
implications. Denial of a warrant application requesting full
access to an e-mail account in this context hampers the
government’s ability to investigate crime,162 and therefore fight it
as effectively as possible.163 This problem is accentuated by the
prevalence of the e-mail account as a means of communication,
both for personal and business use.164 Law enforcement efforts
would also be burdened if, as has been suggested,165 a court were
to order the e-mail service provider or a third party to cull
responsive information from an e-mail account.166 Having an email service provider produce only the responsive information
would involve a number of issues. These include the substantial
burden that would be placed on e-mail service providers,167 e-mail
162

See supra Section II.A.
See In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 395–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also
Amsterdam, supra note 18.
164
The number of e-mail accounts worldwide was estimated to be 3.9 billion in
2013 and is expected to increase to over 4.7 billion by 2017. Email Statistics Report,
2013–2017, THE RADICATI GROUP, INC. (April 2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Email-Statistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary.
pdf.
165
See, e.g., In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL
4647554, at *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013); Friess, supra note 112, at 1013–14.
166
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395.
167
Id. at 394–95; see also Friess, supra note 112, at 1014 (noting the possibility
that e-mail service providers, such as ISPs, may be unwilling to function in this
role). The potential for significant burden becomes obvious when one considers the
number of users some e-mail service providers have. See Sean Ludwig, Gmail
Finally Blows Past Hotmail to Become the World’s Largest Email Service,
VENTUREBEAT (June 28, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/06/28/gmail-hotmail163
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service providers’ lack of skill in conducting law enforcement
investigations,168 and the problem of allowing private companies
to know the details and scope of law enforcement
investigations.169 While some of these issues would not be
present if a court were to instead order a third party, such as a
filter team “consisting of agents or specially-trained computer
personnel . . . who are not involved in the investigation” to sift
through the information,170 this approach is also not free of
issues171 and is often rejected by courts in other contexts.172
In addition, in the similar context of computer searches,
warrants authorizing the wholesale seizure of computer records
by the government have been found reasonable.173 In so holding,
courts recognize that, although probable cause does not exist for
an entire computer, the government may be allowed access to the
computer in order to search for relevant information.174
However, granting a warrant application requesting full
access to an e-mail account, while imposing no subsequent
restrictions on the government’s ability to search and seize the

yahoo-email-users/ (reporting that, in June 2012, Gmail had 425 million monthly
active users).
168
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395. Of course, the government could
provide the e-mail service provider with certain terms for the provider to use to
search for evidence. However, this procedure oversimplifies the nature of
investigations. For a simple explanation of why this is, see New Opinion on Search
Warrants for Online Accounts, supra note 151:
[T]ake the facts of this case. Maybe the suspects in this case are dumb and
they wrote things in their e-mail such as, “let’s engage in a conspiracy to
commit a criminal kickback scheme that is a felony crime!” If so, a keyword
search for terms like “conspiracy” and “kickback” will retrieve at least some
of the evidence. But maybe the suspects are more savvy, and they used code
words that a keyword search won’t easily identify.
169
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395.
170
See Friess, supra note 112, at 1014 (suggesting this method).
171
For example, this approach merely transfers the intrusiveness of the search
from being an act of government to being an act of a third party working at the
direction of the government. Although the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
government over-intrusiveness, privacy concerns are not adequately solved by
having someone else read an individual’s personal information for the government.
172
See United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment [does not] require the executing authorities to delegate a prescreening function to the internet service provider or to ascertain which e-mails are
relevant before copies are obtained from the internet service provider for subsequent
searching.”).
173
See supra Section I.D.2.
174
See supra Section I.D.2.
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information contained within the account,175 is not
unproblematic. Due to the widespread use of e-mail for both
personal and business communication,176 unrestricted wholesale
authorization would give the government the ability to freely
examine and use large masses of information, much of which the
government likely does not have probable cause for.177
Significantly, this is questionable in light of the Fourth
Amendment requirement of particularity in a warrant’s
description and the requisite limited breadth of a subsequent
search and seizure.178
B.

Proposed Resolution

As noted above, denying a warrant application that provides
the government access to an entire e-mail account or having email service provider or third-party involvement is problematic.
This points towards using the other approach some courts have
taken—granting such applications outright.179 However, this
approach is equally problematic because the government would
have virtual carte blanche access to, and the unrestricted ability
to use, all of the information contained in an e-mail account.
And, as the Fourth Amendment reflects, unrestrained
government investigatory capabilities are unsettling. As a
result, adopting the following two restrictions in this context,
while still permitting the government full access to an e-mail
account upon probable cause for some of an account, achieves a
reasonable balance of the government’s and the individual’s
interests: (1) on a case-by-case basis, impose certain
minimization procedures, and (2) eliminate the plain view
doctrine in this context.

175

See supra Section II.B.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
177
In re Target Email/Skype Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-8167-DJW, 2013 WL 4647554, at
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013).
178
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, for example, although in the context of
computer hard drive searches, courts have found the seizure of entire hard drives
reasonable, the subsequent search of the hard drives is still subject to a
reasonableness examination. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir.
2014).
179
See supra Section II.B.
176
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Ex Ante Minimization Procedures

One way in which the government’s and the individual’s
interests can be balanced is the imposition of certain ex ante
minimization procedures, if necessary, to limit government
overintrusiveness when conducting searches of e-mail
accounts.180
Examples of potentially effective minimization
procedures include instructions “requiring police to use focused
search techniques and prohibiting the use of specialized search
tools without prior court authorization,” as well as instructions
“pertaining to the copying, destruction and return of data.”181
The procedures to be imposed, if any, depend upon the nature
and facts of an investigation; however, it is important that courts
consider implementing them to limit the potential for
government overintrusiveness.182
Against this suggestion, some would argue that ex ante
restrictions should be proscribed because they determine the
reasonableness of a search before the search takes place.183
Another argument against the restrictions is that other
procedures, such as suppression motions, provide adequate relief
in themselves.184 However, some courts have recognized the
utility of such restrictions and that some jurisdictions even
statutorily require minimization procedures in the context of
warrants for electronic surveillance.185 While imposing ex ante
minimization procedures is not a flawless solution, the
procedures may provide an effective tool in preventing
government investigatory overreach and should be considered to
provide balance to the competing interests of the individual and
the government.
2.

Elimination of the Plain View Doctrine in This Context

Additionally, to combat the fear of general warrant issuance
in the e-mail context, the government’s ability to use information
found in an e-mail account should be limited to the information
that is specified in the warrant; in other words, the plain view

180
181
182
183
184
185

See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1172 (Vt. 2012).
See supra Section II.B.1.
E.g., Kerr, supra note 141, at 1246.
In re Gmail Account, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1170.

FINAL_GRYZLO

522

10/25/2016 9:01 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:495

doctrine should be eliminated in this context.186 Any information
that may be potentially incriminating but falls outside of the
scope of information to be seized should be subject to exclusion at
trial.
This position recognizes the interests of both the
government and the individual. While the government has
latitude in accessing an individual’s entire e-mail account, its
ability to use any information uncovered is limited in scope to the
information sought before the government started looking into
the account, and to the information for which the government
already had probable cause to believe was in the account.
Despite the advantages this approach has in balancing the
interests of the government and the individual, it comes with the
significant drawback that it could lead to undesirable results due
to its broad and inflexible nature.187 As a disturbing illustration:
[T]he evidence in plain view could be profoundly serious,
ranging from photographs of a kidnapped child to plans to
commit acts of terrorism. The judicial directive to forswear in
advance the plain view doctrine, placed in a different context, is
equivalent to demanding that a DEA investigative team
engaged in the search of a residence for drugs promise to ignore
screams from a closet or a victim tied to a chair.188

As a result, it has been argued that abolishing the plain view
exception is inadvisable because it prevents the government from
prosecuting individuals who are known to have committed crimes
outside the scope of the current investigation.189

186
Professor Orin Kerr has advocated for this abolition in the general electronic
context. See Kerr, supra note 151, at 582–83. This position has also found some
support in the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing,
Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 (2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“When the government
wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage
medium to search for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could
result in the seizure of a computer . . . magistrate judges should insist that the
government forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine.” (citation omitted)). But see
id. at 1184 (Callahan, J., concurring) (“The more prudent course would be to allow
the contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal
course of fact-based case adjudication.”). The elimination of the plain view doctrine
is technically a type of ex ante minimization procedure, as the procedure
prospectively imposes a restriction on the government’s capabilities. In re Search
Warrant, 71 A.3d at 1172.
187
Eric Yeager, Note, Looking for Trouble: An Exploration of How to Regulate
Digital Searches, 66 VAND. L. REV. 685, 714–15 (2013).
188
Id. at 714 (quoting United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL
4728690, at *7 n.3. (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009)).
189
Id. at 715–16.
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Despite the fact that the abolition of the plain view doctrine
may sometimes lead to perverse and undesirable results, there
are a couple of important points to mention in support of
abolishing the plain view doctrine in the context of e-mail. For
example, this approach does not necessarily prevent the
government from prosecuting individuals for crime X when the
warrant is directed toward crime Y. Rather, this abolition only
prohibits the government from prosecuting those individuals for
crime X based on information learned from the warrant seeking
evidence of crime Y. This means that if the government has
probable cause at a later point for the same individual relating to
the crime, which was previously in plain view but not within the
scope of the warrant, the government may still prosecute that
individual for that crime. Additionally, at least in the e-mail
context, absent granting the government broad access to an email account, the government would never come across this
evidence now in “plain view.”
Lastly, if the plain view exception is not abolished in the email context, it is possible that the rationale behind the concepts
of particularity and overbreadth, which are at the core of the
Fourth Amendment, will be rendered irrelevant.190 E-mails, like
other forms of electronic storage and communication, can store
an incredible amount of personal information.
Absent
eliminating the plain view doctrine, allowing the government
access to an entire e-mail account, which is preferable compared
to the alternatives that have been suggested,191 would mean that
no restrictions would exist as to the information the government
could use against an individual.192 This result would run counter
to the Fourth Amendment and could very well have the effect of
rendering the particularity and breadth requirements
immaterial.193
CONCLUSION
The protections of the Fourth Amendment in the electronic
context have started to take shape in recent years.194 Specific to
the context of e-mail accounts, one circuit court has held that
190
191
192
193
194

Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 566.
See supra Section III.A.
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 151, at 566.
Id.
See supra Section I.D and Part II.
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Fourth Amendment protections apply to e-mail accounts stored
with e-mail service providers.195 Courts in other circuits have
cited this opinion with approval.196 However, even if this position
is universally adopted, it would simply mean that a warrant is
required for the government to access an e-mail account stored
with a third party. It does not answer the more specific question
of what portion of an account may constitutionally be provided to
the government under a warrant granting access to the account,
given that the government will likely not have probable cause for
the entire account.197 This issue has been faced by several
district courts, and there is disagreement as to the correct
resolution.198
Ultimately, the approaches of simply granting or denying
such an application fail to adequately account for and balance the
competing interests of the government’s role in investigating
crime and the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
As a result, a middle ground approach is best tailored to fairly
respect both interests: Courts should grant the government
warrants that provide access to an entire e-mail account, even
though probable cause may not exist for the entire account, but
should also, if necessary, impose certain minimization procedures
depending on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In
addition, the plain view exception that applies to physical
searches and seizures should not apply in this context. Through
these methods, the competing interests of the government and
the individual can effectively be balanced and courts can achieve
what has been often explained to be the core of the Fourth
Amendment: reasonableness.

195
196
197
198

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.

